Multi-Agent Dynamical Systems: Equilibria, Learning, and Asymptotics

Monday, February 26, 2024 - 4:00pm

Event Calendar Category

LIDS Seminar Series

Speaker Name

Tamer Başar

Affiliation

UIUC

Building and Room Number

32-155

Abstract

Decision-making in dynamic uncertain environments with multiple agents having possibly misaligned objectives arises in many disciplines and application domains, including control (particularly networked control, such as control and operation of multiple robots, unmanned vehicles, mobile sensor networks, and the smart grid), communications (particularly in the transmission of information to multiple destinations under privacy constraints), distributed opImizaIon (particularly with topological and informational constraints), social networks (such as problems of consensus and dissensus), and economics (such as inducement of behavior via incentive policies). A natural framework, and a comprehensive one, for modeling, optimization, and analysis in such systems is the one provided by stochastic dynamic games, which accommodates different solution concepts depending on how the interactions among the agents are modeled. The inherent asymmetry in information across the agents, with them not operating under the same (and consistent) modeling assumptions, and with strategic interactions taking place in neighborhoods and propagating across the network create major challenges in the decision-making process, necessitating each agent to operate in a non-staIonary environment and develop beliefs on others, with the belief generation process leading to what is known as second-guessing phenomenon. Another challenge presents itself in the scalability of the decision process, as the size of the population of the agents grows. This latter challenge actually turns out to be a blessing in itself, under some (realistic) structural specifications, as in the high population setting the agents become infinitesimal entities, making the underlying dynamic game asymptotically belonging to the class of mean field games (MFGs), a topic that has attracted intense research activity in recent years. This colloquium talk will provide an overview of recent developments in the landscape described above, focusing on some foundational results for both model-based and model-free settings, with the latter involving data-driven policy design, requiring reinforcement learning, zero-order stochastic optimization, and finite-sample analysis. Both single and multiple population scenarios will be covered. Discussion of selected applications and future challenges will conclude the talk.

Biography

Tamer Başar has received B.S.E.E. from Robert College, Istanbul, and M.S., M.Phil, and Ph.D. degrees in engineering and applied science from Yale University. After stints at Harvard University, Marmara Research Institute (Gebze, Turkey), and Boğaziçi University (Istanbul), he joined the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign in 1981, where he is currently Swanlund Endowed Chair Emeritus; CAS Professor Emeritus of ECE; and Research Professor, CSL and ITI. At Illinois, he has served as Director of the Center for Advanced Study (2014-2020), Interim Dean of Engineering (2018), and Interim Director of the Beckman Institute (2008-2010). He is a member of the US National Academy of Engineering and a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences; and Fellow of IEEE, IFAC, SIAM, and AAAI. He has served as President of the IEEE Control Systems Society (CSS), Founding President of the International Society of Dynamic Games (ISDG), and President of the American Automatic Control Council (AACC). He has received several awards and recognitions over the years, including the IEEE CSS Bode Lecture Prize (2004), IFAC’s Quazza Medal (2005), AACC’s Bellman Control Heritage Award (2006), ISDG’s Isaacs Award (2010), the IEEE Control Systems Technical Field Award (2014), Medal of Science of Turkey (1993), IEEE Millennium Medal (2000), and Wilbur Cross Medal from his alma mater Yale University (2021). He has also received honorary doctorates and professorships from a number of international institutions, including KTH Royal Institute of Technology (Stockholm); Tsinghua, Shandong, and Northeastern Universities (China); Boğaziçi and Doğuş Universities (Istanbul); and NAS of Azerbaijan. He was Editor-in-Chief of the IFAC Journal Automatica between 2004 and 2014, and is currently editor of several book series. He has contributed profusely to the fields of systems, control, communications, optimization, networks, and dynamic games, and has current research interests in stochastic teams, games, and networks (with finite- and infinite-population models); multi-agent systems and learning; data-driven distributed optimization; epidemics modeling and control over networks; strategic information transmission, spread of disinformation, and deception; security and trust; energy systems; and cyber-physical systems.